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NOTES
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LIABILITY ON WATERED STOCK
IN MISSOURI
INTRODUCTION
It has been a long-established policy in Missouri that the
holders of "watered" stock in a corporation or their transferees
with notice will be liable under certain circumstances to the
creditors of the company in the event that the company becomes
insolvent and there are no corporate assets upon which to levy.1
Connected with that policy, however, are at least two problems.
One involves deciding whether or not a particular stockholder
should be classed as a watered stockholder. Stated another way,
the court must decide whether the service rendered or the prop-
erty given by the stockholder in exchange for a certain number
of purportedly full paid and non-assessable par value shares2
was sufficient to justify the corporation's having paid for it with
that amount of stock. The solution to this issue involves chiefly
the weighing of experts' opinions on the value of the consider-
1. Babbitt v. Read, 215 Fed. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), affd, 236 Fed. 42 (2d
Cir. 1916) ; Hodde v. Hahn, 283 Mo. 320, 222 S.W. 799 (1920) ; L. M. Rumsey
Manufacturing Co. v. Kaime, 173 Mo. 551, 73 S.W. 470 (1903); Shields v.
Hobart, 172 Mo. 491, 72 S.W. 669 (1903) ; Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 316, 67 S.W.
644 (1902) ; Van Cleve v. Berkey, 143 Mo. 109, 44 S.W. 743 (1897) ; Shickle
v. Watts, 94 Mo. 410, 7 S.W. 274 (1888) ; Wagner v. Eisenmenger, 65 S.W.2d
108 (Mo. App. 1933); Hastings v. Scott, 248 S.W. 973 (Mo. App. 1923);
Raleigh Investment Co. v. Cureton, 232 S.W. 766 (Mo. App. 1921); Rogers
v. Stag Mining Co., 185 Mo. App. 659, 171 S.W. 676 (1915); Schneider v.
Johnson, 143 S.W. 78 (Mo. App. 1912); Anheuser-Busch Brewing Associa-
tion v. Park Novelty Co., 120 Mo. App. 513, 97 S.W. 209 (1906); Shepard
v. Drake, 61 Mo. App. 134 (1895); Leucke v. Tredway, 45 Mo. App. 507(1891) ; Farmers' Bank of Frankfort v. Gallaher, 43 Mo. App. 482 (189G) ;
cf. Meyer v. Ruby Trust Mining & Milling Co., 192 Mo. 162, 90 S.W. 821(1905); Woolfolk v. January, 131 Mo. 620, 33 S.W. 432 (1895); Bobb v.
Walmar Theater Co., 206 Mo. App. 236, 277 S. W. 841 (1921); McClure v.
Paducah Iron Co., 90 Mo. App. 567 (1901); Carp v. Chipley, 73 Mo. App.
22 (1898).
With regard to the liability of transferees with notice, see
Van Cleve v. Berkey, 143 Mo. 109, 44 S.W. 743 (1897); Schneider v.
Johnson, 143 S.W. 78 (Mo. App. 1912); Anheuser-Busch Brewing Associa-
tion v. Park Novelty Co., 120 Mo. App. 513, 97 S.W. 209 (1906).
2. In Livingston, Trustee v. Adams, 226 Mo. App. 824, 43 S.W.2d 836(1931), a holder of no par stock was held liable as an unpaid stockholder
on the ground that the articles of incorporation stated that a certain
amount of property had been paid in when in fact it had not been so paid.
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ation at the time of the transaction,3 and it is, of course, of the
utmost importance to the final outcome of the issue of the impo-
sition of liability. However, the discussion in this note will center
around the other question inherent in the policy set out above;
that is, assuming that the value given for the shares was inade-
quate, under what conditions will the holder of those shares be
held liable to the corporate creditors? It will be pointed out below
that the Missouri courts, prior to the passage of the General and
Business Corporation Act of 1943, had outlined rather clearly the
fact elements which would result in liability of the watered stock-
holder. However, the last sentence of section nineteen of that Act
promises to work a change in Missouri legal theory on this partic-
ular subject. It provides: "In the absence of actual fraud in the
transaction, the judgment of the board of directors or the share-
holders, as the case may be, as to the value of the consideration
received for shares shall be conclusive." 4 As a starting point,
the content of the theory of liability developed in Missouri prior
to 1943 and a summary of the established rules in other jurisdic-
tions will be set forth. Then the possible impact of the new sec-
tion will be discussed.
I. THE ESTABLISHED THEORIES
A. THE MISSOURI RATIONALE
The courts of Missouri, in attempting to give a short explana-
tion of the theory on the basis of which they have held watered
stockholders liable to corporate creditors, have employed two
labels, the trust fund doctrine and the legal fraud theory. On
the surface at least, that practice might be a ground for arguing
that there have'been two separate concepts of liability in this
jurisdiction with regard to watered stockholders. On the one
hand, the first-mentioned term refers to the rationale which dic-
tates that the watered stockholder should be held accountable to
3. See 11 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 5215 (Revised ed. 1932).
4. The provision was first contained in Mo. Laws 1943, p. 410, § 19. It
now appears in Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.185 (1949).
5. Exemplary cases where the phrase "trust fund" or its equivalents have
been used are: Meyer v. Ruby Trust Mining and Milling Co., 192 Mo. 162,90 S.W. 821 (1905); Van Cleve v. Berkey, 143 Mo. 109, 44 S.W. 743 (1897);
Shickle v. Watts, 94 Wo. 410, 7 S.W. 274 (1888). Cases where the phrase
"legal fraud" or its equivalents have been used are: L. M. Rumsey Manu-
facturing Co. v. Kaime, 173 Mo. 551, 73 S.W. 470 (1903) ; Berry v. Rood, 168
Mo. 316, 67 S.W. 644 (1902); Bobb v. Walnar Theater Co., 206 Mo. App.
236, 227 S.W. 841 (1921).
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creditors because the capital stock of a company, especially its
unpaid subscriptions, is a trust fund for the benefit of creditors.6
A corollary of that reasoning is that the legal obligation to pay
the full par value cannot be released even though the directors
have consented to treat the stock as full paid.7 The term "legal
fraud," on the other hand, has been applied to the theory which
holds the owners of diluted stock liable because the issuance of
such stock involves a misrepresentation to those persons who do
business with the corporation in reliance on the outward showing
that the stock is fully paid. Inherent in that approach is the rule
that all prior and those subsequent creditors with notice of the
fact that the stock has been watered are excluded from the right
to sue because it cannot be logically said that they relied on the
ostensible amount of the capital stock.8 So defined, the concepts
seem different. However, a study of the Missouri cases has re-
vealed that the courts of this jurisdiction have merged the two
theories outlined above," and thus it would be hardly accurate to
say that in using the terms "trust fund" and "legal fraud," the
same courts have intended to designate two distinct concepts. On
the contrary, they have employed the two labels to designate the
one theory which has resulted from that merger.
The question then arises: what is the actual content of this
resultant rationale? The decisions show that, although both of
the original theories have influenced the content of this resultant
concept, they have not done so to the same degree. in fact, it is
clear that, regardless of the wording of the opinions, the notion of
strict accountability associated with the trust fund theory has
6. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 349 (Revised ed. 1946).
7. Ibid.
8. Id. § 350.
9. The following quotation from the case of Colonial Trust Co. v. Mac-
Millan, 188 Mo. 547, 87 S.W. 933 (1905) is indicative of this fact:
... it is good law that underlying the trust fund theory and the true
value theory is the proposition that the creditors have the right to
assume that stock has been fully paid in money or money's worth as set
forth solemnly in the articles of association of a corporation and to
extend credit on the faith of such assumption; but because of this
underlying proposition it follows that, if a creditor of an insolvent
corporation did not extend credit on the faith of shareholders' having
paid their stock subscriptions in money or money's worth, but, to the
contrary, knew at the time of the creation of the corporate debt that
such stock was paid for in simulated values, he is not entitled to the
remedy here sought. Id. at 567-568, 87 S.W. at 939.
A statement of similar import may be found in Bobbv. Walmar Theater
Company, 206 Mo. App. 236, 245, 227 S.W. 841, 843 (1921). See BALLANTINE,
op. cit. supra note 6, § 349.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
been the predominant consideration. The truth of that assertion,
despite the fact that the fraud ingredient has been the source of
the one important limitation to an otherwise strict approach,
will be discussed below. The chief reason, however, that the
notion of strict accountability has been predominant is found
in the interpretation that the Supreme Court of Missouri has
given to the constitutional and statutory provisions which
bear on this subject. The constitution of Missouri has long con-
tained a section to the effect that corporate stocks and bonds are
not to be issued except for money paid, labor done, or property
actually received and that all fictitious increases of stock or in-
debtedness are to be considered void.'10 A statutory provision to
the effect that a creditor unsatisfied by an execution issued
against corporate property may have that execution levied
against any stockholder to the extent of the unpaid balance on his
stock has also been the law in this state for many years. 1 Those
provisions have been construed by that court to mean that this
jurisdiction has a conservative approach toward watered stock
schemes. 2 Exemplary of that construction is the following quo-
tation from the oft-cited case of Van Cleve v. Berkey :13
Upon a review of all the cases decided by the appellate
courts of this state since the adoption of the constitution
of 1875,... it is impossible to escape the conviction that in
this state, whatever may be the case in some of the other
states, the "American trust doctrine," .... has indeed been
reenforced by its constitution and statutes; and that the
proposition that the stock of a corporation must be paid for
"in meal or in malt," in money or in mohey's value, is not a
mere figure of speech, but really has the significance of its
terms; it may be paid for in property, but in such case the
property must be the fair equivalent in value to the par
value of the stock issued therefor; that it is the duty of the
stockholders to see that it possesses such value; that when
a corporation is sent forth into the commercial world, ac-
credited by them as possessed of a capital in money, or its
equivalent, in property, equal to the par value of its capital
stock, every person dealing with it, unless otherwise advised,
has a right to extend credit to it on the faith of the fact
10. Mo. CONST. Art. XI, § 7; Mo. CONsT. Art. XII, § 8 (1875); Mo. Rv.
STAT. § 351.160 (1949).
11. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.280 (1949); Mo. REv. STAT. § 736 (1879).
12. Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 316, 67 S.W. 644 (1902) ; Van Cleve v. Berkey,
143 Mo. 109, 44 S.W. 743 (1897).
13. 143 Mo. 109, 44 S.W. 743 (1897).
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that its capital stock has been so paid for, and that the
money or its equivalent in property will be forthcoming to
respond to his legitimate demands; in short, that it is the
duty of the stockholder, and not of the creditor, to see that
it is paid. Hence, the inquiry in a case between a creditor and
a stockholder when property has been paid in for the capital
stock of the corporation, is not whether the stockholder be-
lieved, or had reason to believe that the property was equal
in value to the par value of the capital stock, but whether, in
point of fact, it was such equivalent.'14
As it was indicated above, the courts of this state have not
been inconsistent in using the label "trust fund theory" to de-
scribe the conservative position that they have taken as regards
the watered stockholder since one is part and parcel of the other.
However, misgivings could arise to the assertion that by and
large the name "legal fraud" has been expressive of the same
position. Dispelling those doubts can be perhaps best accom-
plished by showing that, with one qualification, the term "legal
fraud" has not had in Missouri any relation to the theory asso-
ciated with the tort action of deceit and that thus it has actually
referred to something that could not be accurately classed as
fraud.
If it is assumed that the court has already decided that the
consideration was not in fact equal to the aggregate par value of
the shares issued to the stockholder, it could be argued that he
participated in the making of a misrepresentation. That argu-
ment is questionable, 15 but even postulating that it is warranted,
still it is clear that at that point the similarity between the two
types of fraud ceases. In the first place, the Missouri courts have
not required the creditors to establish as conditions to the im-
position of liability that either the defendant stockholder or
those in charge of valuing the consideration 16 knew that they
were making a false representation and that they were actuated
by an intent to deceive.' 7 That fact was pointed up in the case
14. Id. at 135-136, 44 S.W. at 750.
15. Ballantine, Stockholders' Liability in Minnesota, 7 MINN. L. REV.
79, 89 (1923).
16. See note 29 infra.
17. Shields v. Hobart, 172 Mo. 491, 72 S.W. 669 (1903); Berry v. Rood,
168 Mo. 316, 67 S.W. 644 (1902); Van Cleve v. Berkey, 143 Mo. 109, 44
S.W. 743 (1897). In the case of Woolfolk v. January, 131 Mo. 620, 335 S.W.
432 (1895) there was dictum to the effect that "fraud" must be shown in
addition to proof of an over-valuation, but that dictum was disapproved in
Van Cleve v. Berkey, supra. Proof of an intent to deceive is, of course, a
necessary element in the tort action of deceit. PRoSSER, TORTS 705 (1941).
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of Berry v. Rood.-8 There certain of the defendants, who had
been organizers of the defunct corporation, had turned in as full
payment for their stock property worth less than five per cent
of the face value of the stock. After the insolvency of the com-
pany, the receiver sued them to recover their unpaid stock sub-
scriptions. The lower court, on the basis of its finding that the
defendants were blameless of any intentional deception as re-
gards the public or creditors, ruled for the defendants, and the
receiver appealed. The supreme court described and ruled upon
the defendants' arguments for sustaining the lower court as fol-
lows:
The main proposition . . is that a stockholder who has
turned into the corporation property in payment of his
stock, which has been accepted by the corporation as the
equivalent of the face value of the stock, and who has been
guilty of no actual fraud, cannot be called to account by cred-
itors of the concern, or made to pay, in satisfaction of debts,
the difference between the value of the property turned in
and the face value of the stock. This proposition, as con-
tended for, under the facts of this case, also draws a distinc-
tion, in favor of the stockholder, between actual fraud and
legal fraud, and leaves him on the safe side of the line, al-
though the property he turned in was in fact worth less than
5 per cent. of the face value of the stock, provided we find
that his mind had been so excited by indications of prospec-
tive mineral wealth that he really believed that, when the
unexplored caverns should be opened, mines of fabulous
value would be disclosed. If that is the correct interpretation
of the law of Missouri on this subject, then the manifest ef-
forts of the framers of our constitution and the makers of
our statutes to authorize the establishment of only conserva-
tive and reasonably safe business corporations have been in
vain.1 9
In fact, the courts of Missouri have gone further: they have
ruled out the element of wrongful conduct entirely, which fact
is evidenced by the following statement:
the inquiry in a case between a creditor and a stock-
holder, when property has been paid in for capital stock...,
is not whether the stockholder believed, or had reason to be-
lieve, that the property was equal in value to the par value
of the capital stock but whether, in point of fact, it was such
equivalent.20
18. 168 Mo. 316, 67 S.W. 644 (1902).
19. Id. at 328, 67 S.W. 647-648.
20. Van Clevev. Berkey, 143 Mo. 109, 135-136, 44 S.W. 743, 750 (1897).
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Because of that opinion, the concept of liability in this jurisdic-
tion has become known as the "true value" approach. It will be
pointed out later that other states, the so-called "good faith"
states, have required, in addition to evidence that the property
was not actually worth the face value of the stock, proof of some
sort of wrongful conduct on the part of the directors or stock-
holders or of facts from which bad faith on their part could be
inferred. But the Missouri rule has been that that factor is im-
material.
With respect to the element of reliance, the concept of fraud
in relation to stockwatering again differs from the fraud asso-
ciated with the action of deceit. Proof of justifiable reliance is,
of course, an indispensable factor in the tort action,21 but the
attitude of the Missouri courts on this issue in the watered stock
cases is shown in the frequent statements to the effect that every
person has a right to extend credit on the faith of the fact that
capital stock has been paid up in money or in money's worth.2 2
On the basis of the proposition that the creditor has a right to
rely, it would seem to follow that his actually depending on the
capital stock records of the corporation would not be necessary to
his possible cause of action against the watered stockholders, and
the opinions have shown acceptance by the courts of this idea.
As against those who gave credit to the corporation after the is-
suance of the diluted stock 2 1 the courts have uniformly held the
holders of that stock liable without referring any more to the
problem of whether the creditors did in fact rely than merely as-
serting that they did. Thus the satisfaction of this requirement
21. PROssER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 706.
22. See, e.g., Colonial Trust Co. v. MacMillan, 188 Mo. 547, 567-568, 87
S.W. 933, 939 (1905); Van Cleve v. Berkey, 143 Mo. 135-136, 44 S.W. 745,
750 (1897).
23. None of the Missouri cases have involved creditors who e.xtended
credit before the issuance of the diluted stock. In Chrisman-Sawyer Banking
Co. v. Independence Manufacturing Co., 168 Mo. 634, 645, 68 S.W. 1026, 1029
(1902), there is a statement that "all creditors without regard to when their
debts were contracted" have a right to sue the holders of unpaid stock, which
would seem to indicate that even those whose debts were contracted prior to
the issue of the unpaid stock could sue. However, since the plaintiff in that
case was the purchaser of the claim of a subsequent creditor, that statement
is dictum and thus should not be relied on too heavily. Also, in Shickle v.
Watts, 94 Mo. 410, 418, 7 S.W. 274, 277 (1888), there is a statement that
the amount due on unpaid stock is deemed in equity as a ". . .part of the
capital stock for all of the creditors. . . ." However, that case involved
subsequent creditors too, and thus it is also dictum.
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has been more presumed than actual.24 Only in cases where it
would be illogical to say that the creditor was misled, i.e., where
he had actual25 notice that the consideration had been inadequate,
has the liability of the stockholder been restricted on the ground
of failure to comply with this requisite.2r That limitation is an
important one, but it is the only aspect of the Missouri theory
that, as far as the actual decisions are concerned, can be lined up
with the fraud that is the basis of the tort action of deceit.27
24. In Hastings v. Scott, 248 S.W. 973 (Mo. App. 1923), the court said:
creditors of the corporation have the right, in the absence of in-
formation to the contrary, to assume that the value of the assets of the
corporation is equal to its paid-up capital stock, and are presumed to
deal *ith the corporation on the faith of that value .... Id. at 975.
25. In Rogers v. Stag Mining Co., 185 Mo. App. 659, 171 S.W. 676 (1915),
it was ruled that the fact that pursuant to a statutory requirement a copy
of the articles of incorporation of the company had been filed with the
Secretary of State and had been recorded in the county where the corpora-
tion was located was not notice that the stock of the company was watered.
26. Colonial Trust Co. v. MacMillan, 188 Mo. 547, 87 S.W. 933 (1903);
Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 316, 67 S.W. 644 (1902); Bobb v. Walmar Theater
Co., 206 Mo. App. 236, 227 S.W. 841 (1921). Two cases have said that the
creditor who extended credit to the corporation with actual knowledge that
the stock is watered is estopped from suing the watered stockholder. Meyer
v. Ruby Trust Mining & Milling Co., 192 Mo. 162, 90 S.W. 821 (1905);
Rogers v. Stag Mining Co., 185 Mo. App. 659, 171 S.W. 676 (1915).
27. The case of Ingraham v. Commercial Lead Co., 177 Fed. 341 (8th Cir.
1910), is a case where liability of a bonus stockholder in a Missouri corpora-
tion was limited. There a corporation was organized under the laws of
Missouri to engage in the business of lead mining. Its original capital was$60,000. The venture went poorly, and the corporation had incurred debts
of $60,000 or $65,000. In an attempt to get more capital, the original stock-
holders increased their capital stock under the prescribed legal procedure
from $60,000 to $100,000, but they were unsuccessful in getting the new
stock sold. Still having confidence in the ultimate success of their project,
they devised a plan whereby they would lend the corporation $75,000 and,
as an inducement and part consideration for the loan, they would receive in
increased stock fifty per cent of the amount loaned. The evidence showed
that the directors were in absolute good faith in adopting this plan. The
arrangement was carried out, the investors receiving promissory notes to
the amount of the loan plus the agreed amount of stock. However, in spite
of their attempts, the company failed. Subsequently a judgment creditor
brought suit to collect this judgment against the holders of the stock issued
under the above plan on the ground that they had not paid for their stock.
The Circuit Court of Appeals applied the rule set down in the famous
United States Supreme Court case, Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417 (1891),
because the fact situations in both cases were similar, and ruled for the de-
fendant stockholders. In brief, the doctrine of Handley v. Stutz, supra,
is that a "going concern" may, on finding its original capital impaired, issue
new stock and sell it for the best price obtainable, and, provided that the
transaction was in good faith and not just a cover-up for watering the
stock, the holders of the stock so issued will not be liable to creditors.
The courts of Missouri have not dealt with such a factual situation.
However, whether that ruling could become law in this state, should a similar
case arise, would seem to depend, so far as liability on bonus or watered
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss4/3
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At this point it is clear that the term "legal fraud," as it has
been used in the stock watering cases, really has referred to a
concept that is not fraud at all. The name has been expressive
of only one aspect of the Missouri theory of stockholder liability,
i.e., that a creditor who has had actual notice cannot recover.
Otherwise, it is fair to say that the fraud verbiage has actually
been employed as a vehicle for following a policy of almost strict
liability, which policy has been commanded, according to the
interpretation of the Supreme Court of Missouri, by the consti-
tution and statutes of this state.
B. THE RULES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
On the question of the general theory of liability on watered
stock, a majority of the states ostensibly have had an approach
similar to the Missouri theory, i.e., a combination of the original
trust fund and legal fraud concepts. 28 However, there has been a
divergence, at least in the wording of opinions, between Missouri
and a majority of the other jurisdictions on the issue of what
proof has been expected of the creditor before he could legally
hold the watered stockholder accountable. It was pointed out
above that this state has followed the "true value" rule, which
in substance has dictated that the factor of wrongful conduct on
the part of the stockholders or the directors is at the most im-
stock is concerned, on whether the Supreme Court of Missouri would be
willing to distinguish between shares issued as a part of the original capital
and additional snares issued under a later-devised capital set-up. Although
the court in the Ingraham case felt that there were no statutory provisions
affirmatively compelling an opposite result, it should be noted that the
Missouri constitutional and statutory provisions which bear on this subject
do not, with one qualification, make such a distinction. MO. CONST. Art. XI,
§ 7; Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.160 (1949).
The origin of the qualification mentioned may be traced to the later case
of Brockett v. Winkle Terra Cotta Co., 81 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1936). There
the court rejected a reorganization plan for an insolvent corporation under
the terms of which perferred stock in the reorganized company was to be
issued in exchange for the bonds issued under the old capital set-up. The
court reasoned that this arrangement added no new money or its equivalent
to the corporation and that thus the holders of the preferred stock could
well be liable to creditors as watered stock holders. This ruling, however,
probably no longer has any force in Missouri because of the present con-
stitutional and statutory provisions to the effect that no issue or increase of
stock for valid bona fide antecedent debts shall be deemed fictitions or void:
See Mo. CONST. Art. XI, § 7; Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.160 (1949). Thus in this
one particular situation, i.e., where the additional stock is earmarked to
satisfy a valid bona fide antecedent debt, as distinguished from a case where
the stock is given as an inducement for the extension of credit (the
Ingraham case), that stock will probably not be held to be watered.
28. BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 349-350.
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material. The majority of states, on the other hand, has sub-
scribed to the "good faith" rule, which in short has meant that
before the creditor of a corporation could hold a particular stock-
holder liable on the ground that his stock was watered, he had
to prove not only that the property exchanged or the labor
done had been in fact worth less than the aggregate par value
of the stock issued for it but also that those in charge of valuing
the property, the directors,29 had overvalued it in "bad faith."30
The theory has been that if the directors had acted in "good
faith," even though the property was not actually worth the
amount in cash that the dirtctors assigned to it, the creditors
could not recover. What type of conduct by the directors has
constituted "fraudulent" action has varied from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, but the majority of the "good faith" courts have held
that if the creditors could prove that the property was overvalued
and that the overvaluation was deliberate, they could recover.,1
In addition, a considerable number of courts have adhered to the
rule that a gross or obvious overvaluation is strong evidence of
fraud, which, if not rebutted by the defendant stockholder, is con-
clusive against him.3 2 The decisions of the Court of Chancery
of New Jersey have represented another interpretation of the
rule. That tribunal has exacted much higher standards of con-
29. It will be noted in the "good faith" states, the "bad faith" of the
directors, in addition to evidence of an overvaluation of the consideration,
could theoretorically result in liability even though the particular stock-
holder held was innocent. A similar result could conceivably occur under
section nineteen since it provides that so long as actual fraud in the trans-
action is not shown,* "the judgment of the board of directors or the share-
holders, as the case may be" shall be conclusive on the issue of valuation.[Italics ours].
At first glance, it may seem unfair to hold the stockholder liable because
the directors have acted wrongfully, but that apparent injustice is dispelled
by two considerations. One is that in the great majority of stockwatering
eases the interests of the directors and the stockholders have been almost
identical. The directors usually have valued property which they themselves
owned, or they have been mere dummies acting in behalf of the property
owners. The Missouri cases illustrate this fact, and it seems improbable
that the situation will be different very often in the future. See DODD,
STOCK WATERING 58 n. 1 (1930).
If, however, such a case should arise, it is almost certain that under the
Missouri theory of almost strict liability, the innocent stockholder would
still be held liable. Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 316, 67 S.W. 644 (1902). Thus
the Missouri Supreme Court has settled in the negative the question of
whether such a result is an unfair one.
30. DODD, STOCK WATERING 58-61 (1930).
31. Ibid.
32. Id. at 70.
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duct by the directors before the creditors will be prevented from
recovering. This may be seen in the following quotation:
When such differences are brought before judicial tribu-
nals, the judgment of those who are by law intrusted with
the power of issuing stock "to the amount of the value of the
property" and on whom, therefore, is placed the first duty of
valuing the property, must be accorded considerable weight.
But it cannot be deemed conclusive when duly subjected tojudicial scrutiny. Nor is it necessary that concious overval-
uation or any other fraudulent conduct on the part of these
primary valuers should be shown to justify judicial inter-
position. Their honest judgment, if reached without due ex-
amination into the elements of value, or if based in part
upon an estimate of matters which really are not, property,
or if plainly warped by self-interest may lead to a violation
of this statutory rule as surely as would corrupt motive.33
Thus "good faith" in New Jersey has meant that there must be
evidence that the directors exercised ordinary business prudence
in their valuation of the property and that they did so without
any hope of furthering their own personal interests. Anything
less would render the stockholder liable.
As compared with the "good faith" rule, the "true value" rule
has been criticized on the ground that although it is good policy
to shield creditors against the fraudulent sales of corporate
stock, it is going too far "to hold liable an honest subscriber, who
has paid for his shares in good faith, in property, at what he and
the officers of the company thought it was worth, because in the
subsequent judgment of a judge or jury it was not worth that
much." It seems clear that theoretically, at least, such a criti-
cism is valid not only on grounds of fairness but also because a
strict application of the rule would result in discouraging pros-
pective investors in stock. 35 However, arguing the merits of that
criticism would not be productive for two reasons: (1) In the
majority of cases decided in Missouri under the "true value"
rule, the overvaluation of the property was so gross that even if
33. Donald v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 62 N. J. Eq. 729, 731-
752, 48 Atl. 771, 772-773 (1901). This case was a stockholders' suit to
enjoin the company from issuing stock, but it was quoted with approval in
subsequent New Jersey cases where creditors' rights were being asserted.
Holcombe v. Trenton White City Co., 80 N.J. Eq. 122, 82 Atl. 618 (1812),
aff d, 82 N.J. Eq. 364, 91 Atl. 1069 (1913) ; See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N.J. Eq.
36, 61 Atl. 843 (1905).
34. McClure v. Paducah Iron Co., 90 Mo. App. 567, 580 (1901).
35. Schenck v. Andrews, 57 N.Y. 133, 142, 143 (1874).
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the "good faith" rules of other jurisdictions had been applied, the
defendant stockholders would in all probability have been held
liable.36 Thus the actual decisions, as distinguished from the
theory, cannot be criticized as having been unduly strict. (2)
The adoption of section nineteen seems clearly to have changed
Missouri from a "true value" to a "good faith" state since, by the
very terms of the section, "actual fraud" will be required before
the directors' valuation of the property will be upset.37 The
element of fraud has been made, by statute, material where it
was not so before.
II. THE MEANING OF THE NEW PROVISION
At this point, it would be well to restate the provision hence-
forth to be discussed. Section nineteen of the Missouri General
and Business Corporation Act of 1943 provides, inter cdic:
In the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the judg-
ment of the directors or the shareholders, as the case may
be, as to the value of the consideration received for shares
shall be conclusive. 38
36. Hodde v. Hahn, 283 Mo. 320, 222 S.W. 799 (1920) (in consolidation
of two companies into one with capital of $50,000, the two old companies
were transferred to the new corporation at an aggregate valuation of
$50,000, $30,000 of which was goodwill); Shields v. Hobart, 172 Mo. 491,
725 S.W. 669 (1903) (land purchased for $26,000 capitalized two days later
at $100,000) ; Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 316, 67 S.W. 644 (1902) (land actually
worth around $8,000 exchanged for $200,000 worth of stock) ; Van Cleve v.
Berkey, 143 Mo. 109, 44 S.W. 743 (1897) ($100,000 worth of stock ex-
changed for a worthless patent); Hastings v. Scott, 248 S.W. 973 (Mo.
App. 1923) (property worth $18,000 exchanged for $30,000 worth of stock) ;
Raleigh Investment Co. v. Cureton, 232 S.W. 766 (Mo. App. 1923) (property
exchanged for the stock was actually worth only one-fifth of the par value
of the stock); Rogers v. Stag Mining Co., 185 Mo. App. 659, 171 S.W. 676
(1915) (property worth $1,000 exchanged for $48,000 worth of stock);
Schneider v. Johnson, 143 S.W. 78 (Mo. App. 1912) (lease worth $15,000
exchanged for $79,400 worth of stock); Farmers' Bank of Frankfort v.
Gallaher, 43 Mo. App. 482 (1890) (real property worth $2,000 capitalized
at $24,800). The facts of the case of L. M. Rumsey Manufacturing Co. v.
Kaime, 173 Mo. 551, 73 S.W. 470 (1903) might provide a basis for arguing
that defendant stockholders would not have been held liable under the
"good faith" rule whereas they were held liable under the "true value" rule.
There goods of an actual value of $77,000 were transferred to the corpora-
tion for $95,000 in stock, but only after the defendant stockholders' ap-
praisers had valued the goods at $102,000. Perhaps the defendants in that
case were in good faith because of that appraisal.
37. In Whitlock v. Alexander, 160 N.C. 465, 76 N.E. 538 (1912), it was
ruled that the North Carolina actual fraud provision established the "good
faith" rule in that state.
38. See note 4 supa. The Missouri provision differs from all its counter-
parts except that of Illinois in that it contains the words " . . or the
shareholders, as the case may be. .. ." This language apparently is with
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The problem now is: what construction will the Supreme
Court of Missouri put on this section? In an attempt to find
guides to possible interpretations, the decisions in other jurisdic-
tions which have or have had in substance the same provision
will be discussed39
One possible choice would be to say that the statute requires
the creditor, or other party seeking to upset the directors' valua-
tion, to establish that the directors have been guilty of common
law fraud. This, of course, would involve his proving that those
who made the appraisal had been guilty of a misrepresentation
to the creditor, that they had been actuated by an intent to de-
ceive, that the creditor had justifiably relied on the verity of that
representation to his damage.40 The West Virginia case of
Fayette Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Brown Bros.41 seems to indi-
cate that that state, in which a provision similar to the Missouri
provision is in effect, 42 has taken the above view with regard to
the meaning of the section. There the partners in a lumber busi-
ness formed a corporation and transferred the assets of the
partnership, subject to its liabilities, to the new company in ex-
change for $10,000 of its par value capital stock. At the time of
the transfer the liabilities of the partnership were $10,960; hence
the directors, who were the three former partners and the wives
of two of them, must have valued the property at $20,960. After
the insolvency of the company, the corporate creditors sought to
hold the stockholders personally liable. The Supreme Court of
West Virginia found that the market value of the assets of the
partnership was around $11,034 but ruled that the stock was
still full-paid and non-assessable because there was no evi-
dence of deceit on the part of the appraisers and because there
reference to a provision in the same section which allows the shareholders
to fix the consideration for the issuance of no par shares if that right has
been reserved to them in the articles of incorporation. See Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 351.185 (1949).
39. The following statutory provisions contain the words "actual fraud":
DEL. REv. CODE c. 65, § 14 (1935); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, § 157.18 (1951);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-205 (Burns 1933); KANs. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3206
(Corrick 1949) ; ME. REV. STAT. c. 49, § 18 (1944) ; MO. REV. STAT. § 351.185
(1949); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-128 (1943); NEv. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 1611(1929); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-319 (1941); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-63
(1943) ; ORE. COMP. LAWS ANN. 77-238 (1940); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 3040
(1949). Only cases from states which have construed their actual fraud
provisions have been included in the text discussion.
40. PROssMR op. cit. supra note 17, at 705.
41. 102 W.Va. 181, 135 S.E. 235 (1926).
42. W.VA. CODE ANN. § 3040 (1949).
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was no proof that the creditors of the corporation had been mis-
led because of that valuation.
However, the other states which have or have had sections
substantially identical with section nineteen and which have con-
strued them have not taken the West Virginia approach.43 In
fact, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey took an almost dia-
metrically opposite view. It has been mentioned above that a
good statement of the New Jersey policy with regard to the
problem of watered stock is found in the following quotation:
When such differences are brought before judicial tribunals,
the judgment of those who are by law entrusted with the
power of issuing stock "to the amount of the value of the
property" and on whom, therefore, is placed the first duty
of valuing the property, must be accorded considerable
weight. But it cannot be deemed conclusive when duly sub-jected to judicial scrutiny. Nor is it necessary that con-
scious overvaluation or any other fraudulent conduct on the
part of the primary valuers should be shown to justifyjudicial interposition. Their honest judgment, if reached
without due examination into the elements of value, or if
based in part upon an estimate of matters which really are
not property, or if plainly warped by self-interest may lead
to a violation of the statutory rule as surely as would cor-
rupt motive.4 4
The existence of the provision that the directors' judgment
should be conclusive in the absence of actual fraud was not
deemed to have any effect on that rule; indeed, it was considered'
to be merely declaratory of it. 45 Thus that court did not deem
that that provision even connoted a requirement that the party
seeking to upset the directors' valuation prove intentionally
43. The New Jersey actual fraud provision, contained in Section 49 of the
New Jersey Corporations Act of 1896, was repealed in 1913. N.J. Laws
1913, c. 15, p. 28. For a discussion of the effect of its repeal on the State
of the New Jersey law, see Bryson v. Conlen, 104 N.J. Eq. 180, 144 Atl. 723(1929). On the basis of what was said in that case, it appears that the
quotation set out in the text is still the law in New Jersey. Interestingly
enough, however, it appears that for pleading purposes at least, the New
Jersey courts still require that the party seeking to upset the directors'
valuation allege in his petition that there was actual fraud in the trans-
action. Sokoloff v. Wildwood Pier and Realty Co., 108 N.J. Eq. 362, 155
Atl. 125 (1931).
44. Donald v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 62 N.J. Eq. 729, 731,
48 Atl. 771, 772 (1901).
45. Holcombe v. Trenton White City Co., 80 N.J. Eq. 122, 82 Atl. 618(1912), aff'd, 82 N.J. Eq. 364, 91 Atl. 1069 (1913); see Easton National
Bank v. American Brick and Tile Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 326, 329, 60 Atl. 54,
55 (1905).
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wrongful actions by the valuers. In addition, the factor of re-
liance was not even mentioned in the opinions. Such an inter-
pretation meant that although New Jersey under its actual fraud
provision had on the surface a "good faith" rule, there was not
much difference, so far as the practical effect on watered stock-
holders was concerned, between it and the Missouri "true value"
rule.
The decisions by the Supreme Court of North Carolina on
the question of liability on watered stock have been more con-
sistent with the apparent mandate of the actual fraud provision
than the New Jersey opinions. Although both states have, by
failing to mention the reliance factor, impliedly agreed that it is
unimportant, North Carolina has at least required proof of a
gross and intentional overvaluation. However, it is arguable
that in so ruling the court was not consciously following the
actual fraud section. A discussion of two North Carolina cases
will serve to point up this incongruity.
The early decision of Hobgood v. Ehlen,46 although it did not
involve the North Carolina actual fraud provision, has become
the basic North Carolina watered stock case. There the trustee
of a bankrupt Delaware corporation sued the stockholders and
promoters of the company, who had gotten their stock in ex-
change for the assets of a lumber business formerly owned by
them. The evidence showed that the directors of the company
had been under the control of the defendants and that the con-
sideration for the stock had been grossly and intentionally over-
valued. In addition, there had been a secret parol agreement
between the defendants and the corporation by which the cor-
poration was to reimburse the defendants for the property con-
veyed to it; hence, all that the corporation had actually received
had been the goodwill of the lumber business. The trial court
applied the pertinent Delaware statutory section, which provided
at that time that the dirctors' judgment should be conclusive in
the absence of fraud, not "actual fraud." The trial court charged
the jury that the word "fraud" meant actual, not constructive,
fraud and that thus it required proof of an intent to deceive. The
defendants were held liable, the jury having found that they had
been so motivated, and one of them appealed on the ground that
the above evidence was inadequate to establish such an intent.
46. 141 N.C. 344, 53 S.E. 857 (1906).
Washington University Open Scholarship
574 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled that the "circum-
stances were amply sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the
issue of actual fraud, and warranted their finding." 47 At the end
of its opinion, the court further stated:
Although a margin may be allowed for an honest difference
of opinion as to value, a valuation grossly excessive, know-
ingly made,.. . is a fraud on creditors and they may proceed
against the stockholder individually, who sells the property,
as for an unpaid subscription.",
That assertion has become the North Carolina rule even in cases
where the actual fraud provision of that state has been ap-
plicable.49
Assuming that the North Carolina Supreme Court still feels,
as it implied in the Hobgood opinion, that the phrase "actual
fraud" requires proof of an intent to mislead, the rule that the
directors' valuation should be upset on proof of a gross and
intentional overvaluation does not seem to be, in spite of state-
ments to the contrary,50 inconsistent with, such a requirement.
It is clear that, excepting the possibility of an admission, the
fact of a deceitful intent is going to have to be established by
circumstantial evidence, and it has been ruled that such an intent
can be raised from evidence that the party making the represen-
tation knew that he had insufficient information by which he
could justify it."' On that rationale, it could be argued that the di-
rectors, by having grossly and wilfully overvalued the property,
had been motivated by such an intent. The mere fact of the
grossness would indicate that the information, if any, that the
directors had was insufficient, and the words "knowingly made"
or their equivalents would seem to be just another way of saying
that the directors knew that they had inadequate information on
which to base their valuation.
However, on the basis of Goodman v. White,5 2 it could be con-
tended that the Supreme Court of North Carolina would not ac-
cept such an argument. There the trustees of a bankrupt cor-
poration had sued a stockholder of the company on an alleged
47. Id. at 348, 53 S.E. at 859.
48. Id. at 354-355, 53 S.E. at 861.
49. Goodman v. White, 174 N.C. 399, 93 S.E. 906 (1917); see Whitlock
v. Alexander, 160 N.C. 465, 469, 76 S.E. 538, 540 (1912).
50. DODD, Op. cit. supra note 30, at 60.
51. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 729.
52. 174 N.C. 399, 93 S.E. 906 (1917).
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unpaid stock subscription. The evidence showed a lack of exer-
cise of independent judgment on the part of the valuers of the
property and a gross and intentional overvaluation. The trial
court gave a directed verdict for the plaintiff, and on appeal the
North Carolina Supreme Court, following the Hobgood rule,
affirmed the action of the trial court. However, when it quoted
the applicable statutory provision, the word "actual" was
omitted. Does that omission indicate that that court thought that
the proof offered was insufficient to establish actual fraud ?
3
Since that question is not answered, it could conceivably be argued
that that was the court's opinion. And yet, on the basis of the
above considerations with respect to the probative value of the
fact of a gross and intentional overvaluation, it seems that there
was really no reason to leave out the word "actual." The result
of all this is that there is no definitive ruling by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court on the issue of how much proof will be ex-
acted under the actual fraud section. However, the court has
been very clear on how much proof it will require before up-
setting the directors' valuation and holding the stockholder liable.
The Court of Chancery of Delaware indicated at a rather early
date that it did not equate the phrase "actual fraud" with com-
mon law fraud. In Ellis v. Penn Beef Co.54 a stockholder of a
corporation brought a bill in equity to have cancelled the shares
of two other stockholders and to have a receiver pendente lite
appointed. The Chancellor heard the case on the issue of why a
receiver should not be appointed. The facts before the court
showed that the other two stockholders, who had been incor-
porators of the company, had gotten their shares by virtue of an
agreement under which they were to convey a lease and some
personal property to the company in payment for their stock, the
par value of which was $20,000. The directors, who were con-
trolled by these two stockholders, had valued the aggregate con-
sideration at $20,000, but the fact was that the defendants had
53. It should be noted that the present North Carolina statutes contain
two provisions concerning the conclusiveness of the directors' judgment on
the issue of valuation. One says that their judgment shall be conclusive in
the absence of fraud. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-62 (1943). The following
section says that their judgment shall be conclusive in the absence of actual
fraud. N.C. GuN. STAT. ANN. § 55-63 (1943). The provision referred to in
Goodman v. White, 174 N.C. 399, 93 S.E. 906 (1917) was the predecessor
of the present actual fraud provision.
54. 9 Del. Ch. 213, 80 Atl. 666 (1911).
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failed to give the real consideration for which the shares had
been issued to them. However, it was also established that the
complainant had had notice of the way in which defendants had
gotten their stock. The court ruled that that fact was not con-
clusive against him and then went on to discuss the application
of the Delaware actual fraud provision's as follows:
If all the then stockholders join in an action by the com-
pany by its officers and directors, in issuing part of the
capital stock for something which does not exist and which
they never furnish to the company, it is an "actual fraud"
though no one be then deceived or injured. There is fraud
towards the state, which in effect has prohibited such trans-
actions. No pretended exercise of judgment can say that
something which has no existence has value. There is pos-
sibly an actual fraud against the stockholders who subse-
quently acquired shares then unissued.' 6
The decision on the effect of the fact that complainant had
had notice is completely contrary to any idea of reliance.07 In
addition, it seems difficult to say that the language of the quo-
tation imports that the court felt that an intent to deceive was
part of the meaning of actual fraud.
However, a somewhat different view was taken in the com-
paratively recent case of Diamond State Brewery, Inc. v.
de la Rigaudiere.58 There the corporation was suing to cancel
the defendants' stock, the aggregate par value of which was
$81,250. Although the directors had valued at that amount the
formula which had been given for the stock, the fact was that
the formula had no substantial value. In addition, there was
evidence of a partial failure of the consideration. The court
ruled that although a showing of an excessive valuation was not
sufficient to overcome the conclusiveness of the directors' judg-
ment, that factor could be considered in connection with other
circumstances from which fraud could be inferred. Thus, since
there was coupled with the fact of gross overvaluation the fact
of the partial failure of the consideration, the court upset the
directors' appraisal and allowed the cancellation. It based its
decision on the Kentucky case of McCoombs Producing and
55. Ds. Rzv. CODE c. 65, § 14 (1935).
56. Ellis v. Penn Beef Co., 9 Del. Ch. 213, 219-220, 80 AtI. 666, 668(1911).
57. BALLANTINE, op. cit. upra note 6, § 350.
58. 25 Del. Ch. 257, 17 A.2d 313 (1941).
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Refining Co. v. Ogle,' 9 which also involved the Delaware actual
fraud section. In that case the following statement was made:
That actual fraud or intentional wrongdoing may be and
often is proved by or inferred from circumstances is an es-
tablished principle, and that inadequacy of consideration
may be considered in connection with other facts from which
fraud may be inferred is also well settled.60
In the de la Rigaudiere case, the Delaware court also said:
The issuance of stock as full paid for a consideration never
delivered to, nor acquired by the corporation constitutes
"actual fraud" within the meaning of Section 14 of the Dela-
ware Corporation Law. Ellis v. Penn Beef Co. . . . Indeed,
the circumstances of this case [the de la Rigaudiere case]
point to the conclusion that the resolutions and dealings with
respect to the formula and equipment were nothing more
than a veil to hide the issuance of shares without considera-
tion.61
The statement to the effect that the issuance of stock as full paid
for a consideration never acquired by the corporation constitutes
actual fraud does not seem to refer to proof of an intent to
deceive. The fact, however, that the court based its decision on
the McCoombs case in addition to the general emphasis of the
opinion indicates that it now considers the phrase "actual fraud"
to refer to proof of such an element.
Guides to possible interpretations of the Missouri actual fraud
provision may also be found in the pronouncements of the Su-
preme Court of Missouri in past watered stock cases in which
the phrase or its equivalents were used. It will be recalled that
that court rejected the contention that an intent to deceive must
be established before the watered stockholder could be held liable.
However, the wording of the discussions of that contention
indicates strongly that the court felt that an intent to mislead
was an essential element in the meaning of the words "actual
fraud." Thus in Van Cleve v. Berkey62 the following extract
from the opinion of the lower court was adopted as a fair state-
ment of the case:
The evidence shows that all of the defendants acted in good
faith, so far as their actual intentions were concerned, and
59. 200 Ky. 208, 254 S.W. 425 (1923).
60. Id. at 214, 254 S.W. at 428.
61. Diamond State Brewery, Inc. v. de la Rigaudiere, 25 Del. Ch. 257, 264,
17 A.2d 313, 317 (1941).
62. 143 Mo. 109,44 S.W. 743 (1897).
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that none of them was moved by any actual fraudulent intent
in the transaction. 3
Later on in the same opinion the court noted that the counsel
for the defendant-appellants (the watered stockholders) con-
tended that judgment should have been for them:
... for the reason that it is not alleged in the petition, nor
shown by the evidence, that the stockholders, in capitalizing
the Braun invention ... and issuing therefor full paid and
non-assessable stock... actually intended to defraud credi-
tors of the corporation or purchasers of its stock. . . . In
other words, the contention is that as the corporation could
receive property in payment for its capital stock, and did in
fact accept the valueless Braun invention in full payment
thereof, in the absence of actual fraud upon the part of the
corporators charged and affirmatively proven aliunde the
transaction, the appellants' stock, as to the creditors of the
corporation, was fully paid for, and they should have hadjudgment.64
Although the court then went on to reject the contention that,
because the defendant-stockholders had been in good faith,
they were not liable, such statements are helpful, for present
purposes, to show what that tribunal felt that the phrase "actual
fraud" connoted.
It will be noted that the element of justifiable reliance was not
mentioned in the statements just quoted. However, it could be
argued that that fact should not be given too much weight since
the requirement of reliance, if there had been such a require-
ment in Missouri at the time that those assertions were made,
was presumed to be satisfied and thus the court would not have
felt the need to say expressly that that factor was also inherent
in the meaning of the phrase. Consequently, it seems possible
that the Missouri Supreme Court could require proof of both
an intent to deceive and justifiable reliance and still be consistent
with its prior statements.
Finally, there are the Oregon decisions on that state's counter-
part to section nineteen. The construction represented by those
cases differs from the above interpretations in that in it the
meaning of the other words in the section have been stressed. A
63. Id. at 117, 44 S.W. at 744.
64. Id. at 119-120, 44 S.W. at 744-745. To the same effect, see the quota-
tion in the preceding section from Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 316, 67 S.W.
644 (1902).
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case in point is Atwell v. Schmitt6 5 Plaintiff there was a cor-
porate creditor seeking to enforce defendant's liability on
allegedly unpaid stock. The facts showed a gross overvaluation;
two hundred thousand dollars' worth of stock had been issued to
the promoters as fully paid in exchange for options on which they
had expended four hundred dollars. The facts also indicated a
personal interest of the directors in the overvaluation and lack
of an exercise of independent judgment by the directors in their
appraisal. In ruling for the plaintiff, the court pointed out:
The judgment of the directors of a corporation upon the
value of property or stock to be taken and accepted by the
corporation in exchange for its own stock . . ., the exercise
of which, when acted upon, is made conclusive by statute,
refers to an honest attempt to determine the value of the
property or stock by a board of directors representing the
corporation alone and... anxious to secure for the corpora-
tion all that it is justly entitled to. Anything less than
that is dishonest and fraudulent. The directors may be
honestly mistaken. They may exercise poor judgment and
make a very poor bargain, but this is wholly immaterial so
long as they have no personal interests of their own to
further and act fairly and honestly by the corporation they
profess to represent.1'
The court then went on to rule that since the directors had been
personally interested in the transaction and since there had been
a gross overvaluation of the consideration, there had been no such
exercise of judgment by the directors as was intended by the
statute and that thus their appraisal was not conclusive.6 7 It
65. 111 Ore. 96, 225 Pac. 325 (1924).
66. Id. at 106, 225 Pac. at 328. Dictum from the Maine case of Mason v.
Carrothers, 105 Me. 392, 404, 74 Atl. 1030, 1035 (1909) indicates that
Maine has taken an approach similar to that of Oregon on this issue. For
an argument in favor of adopting an interpretation similar to that of
Oregon, see Wallstein, The Issue of Corporate Stock for Property Purchase
-A New Phase, 15 YALE L.J. 111 (1906).
67. A parallel approach was taken in the Delaware case of Cahall v.
Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 Atl. 224 (1921), aff'd, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 118 Atl.
1 (1922). There the receiver of a dissolved corporation brought suit to
recover from the officers and directors of the company and others property
of the corporation improperly disposed of by the officers and directors.
Part of this property improperly disposed of was ninety shares of the
corporation's stock which the directors had issued to themselves for services
rendered in organizing the company and selling its stock. The court ruled
that as regards these ninety shares, the directors' action was constructively
fraudulent on the other stockholders because there was no express or im-plied contract on the part of the company to pay for the "services." There
was no such contract because the defendants had not been the proper officersto make it for the corporation. To the defendants' contention that the
valuation of the issuance cannot be avoided on the grounds of constructive
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should be mentioned that there were indications in the opinion
that the court felt that the two factors referred to above con-
clusively established fraud, but the emphasis in that opinion as
well as in later Oregon decisions was on the idea that a legal
judgment had not been exercised.,8
What are the relative merits of these various constructions?
The West Virginia interpretation is most consistent with the
common law conception of fraud. However, it is wondered
whether its adoption would work justice in the watered stock
situation. Even disregarding the problem of establishing deceit,
the creditor would have considerable difficulty in establishing
that he had actually relied on the professed capital of the com-
pany before extending credit to it. Present day businessmen
require much more assurance that the debtor corporation will be
able to repay than merely the amount of its ostensible capital."°
The possible result of following that construction would be a shift
from a situation where in nearly all the cases the watered stock-
holder is held liable to one where in only a very few cases would
he be held accountable. In view of the established Missouri
theory of almost strict liability on watered stock, it is doubtful
whether the Supreme Court of this state would be willing to
accept the possibility of such a great change.
In addition, there are two reasons which militate against the
adoption of the New Jersey definition of the phrase even though
that interpretation in effect comes very close to the "true value"
rule. One is that such a construction is, to say the least, far re-
moved from the elements generally associated with the fraud
concept.70 Furthermore, the Missouri Supreme Court has in
past used the label "actual fraud" in a way that clearly evidences
fraud because of the "actual fraud" provision in the statute the court an-
swered that these defendants, being personally interested in the transaction
were wholly incompetent to represent the corporation in the transaction and
were not "directors" within the meaning of that term as used in the pro-
vision. Thus, instead of making the meaning of the phrase "actual fraud"
determinative of the outcome, the Delaware court in the above case made
the decision on that issue turn on the legal significance of the term "di-
rectors."
68. Compton v. Perkins, 144 Ore. 346, 24 P.2d 670 (1933) ; Rugger v. Mt.
Hood Electric Co., 143 Ore. 193, 20 P.2d 412 (1933).
69. Ballantine, supra note 15, at 90. See Merchants' and Mechanics' Sav-
ings Bank v. Belington Coal & Coke Co., 51 W.Va. 60, 79-80, 41 S.E. 390,
398 (1902).
70. See Wickersham, The Capital of a Corporation, 22 HARv. L. RBu.
319 (1909).
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NOTES
that that court deemed an intent to deceive an inherent feature
of the concept that that label represents. The use of the New
Jersey construction would involve the disregard of those pro-
nouncements.
Since the North Carolina Supreme Court has not indicated
clearly what it considers the phrase "actual fraud" to signify,
it would be misleading to say that the decisions of that court
constitute another possible interpretation of the provision. How-
ever, the uncertainty connected with the North Carolina ap-
proach does not much matter because the issues discussed in the
North Carolina opinions, as distinguished from the actual deci-
sions, suggest a construction like that of Delaware, i. e., that the
words "actual fraud" do not require proof of reliance on the
valuation by the party seeking to upset it but that they do re-
quire proof of an intent to deceive on the part of the valuers.
The adoption of such an interpretation would force the Missouri
courts to determine how much and what type of evidence will
be required before an intent to deceive may be legally inferred.
Should evidence of a gross and intentional overvaluation be suf-
ficient to take the case to the jury on the issue of actual fraud,
or should other circumstances be required? Such decisions will
not be easy ones to make since they will involve the weighing of
the probative value of circumstantial evidence. On the other
hand, such a construction would have merit in that it would be
consistent with prior statements of the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri on the issue of the meaning of actual fraud.
Finally, the Missouri Supreme Court could construe section
nineteen in the manner that the Oregon Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the Oregon counterpart. That construction may be
recommended because under it the same evidentiary factors could
be used to upset the directors' valuation and still their use would
not raise any question with regard to whether the court was
leaning over backwards to reach a desired result. No matter
how one may view the probative value of a gross and intentional
overvaluation on the issue of actual fraud, that circumstance is
strong evidence that the directors have not exercised a business-
like judgment. However, such a construction does not seem to
be in line with the spirit of the provision. If all that the legis-
lature had desired when it passed this section was that the direc-
tors should exercise a legal judgment in the valuation of the
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property, it seems difficult to perceive why the phrase containing
the words "actual fraud" was included. That factor is the one
great drawback of the Oregon interpretation.
In summary, it is submitted tlat, taking all aspects of the
problem into consideration, the adoption by Missouri of an in-
terpretation to the effect that the words "actual fraud" require
proof of an intent to deceive in the valuation but not of justifiable
reliance on that valuation would be the most advisable course to
take. Admittedly, it will be hard to determine the quantum and
type of evidence that will be expected in order to prove an intent
to deceive. However, such a course does not carry with it such a
propensity for radical change on the important issue of the fre-
quency of liability on watered stock as does the West Virginia
approach. Furthermore, the recommended interpretation not
only is more in line with the clear meaning of the provision than
either the New Jersey or Oregon constructions, but it also is
more consistent with the past statements of the Supreme Court
of Missouri on this subject.
CONCLUSION
With the enactment of section nineteen, it is clear that the law
of Missouri has been altered on the issue of how much proof
will be required of the party who seeks to hold a stockholder
liable on the ground that his stock is watered. Whereas the fraud
element under the "true value" rule was deemed immaterial, the
complainant in the future will have to establish actual fraud in
the transaction before the directors' valuation of the considera-
tion will be upset. On the question of possible interpretations,
the best alternative appears to be that the phrase "actual fraud"
requires proof of an intent to deceive in the appraisal but not
proof of justifiable reliance on that appraisal. On the issue of
how to prove such an intent, it has been pointed out above that it
could be argued that evidence of a gross and intentional over-
valuation is alone sufficient to establish actual fraud. However,
the Missouri courts may require more evidence than that. In any
event,,it will be interesting to see what course they do take with
regard to this problem.
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